The Cognitive and Ethical Scope of “Confusion” in Baumgarten's Aesthetics by Nakamura, Tomoe
THE COGNITIVE AND ETHICAL SCOPE OF 
“CONFUSION” IN BAUMGARTEN’S AESTHETICS 
Tomoe Nakamura 
(Monash University) 
1. Introduction 
Baumgarten’s aesthetics as scientia cognitionis sensitivae had been 
traditionally seen as obsolete. Philosophers who focused on his aesthetics 
as die Wissenschaft des Schönen, criticised it by contending that beauty is 
not an objective property and thus it was impossible to elevate the 
standard of the judgment of beauty to the level of science (Kant 
AK3:B35, AK 5:304-305).1 Although his attempt to reconcile the values 
of the sensory and the intellectual was occasionally appreciated (Cassirer 
356), his attempt was considered to be unsuccessful as he adopted 
Leibnizian epistemology, which Croce called “intellectualism”, and saw 
the epistemic value of sensory perception despite it being non-epistemic. 
However, recent commentary has paid more attention to the 
potential of Baumgarten’s aesthetics, especially from a hermeneutical 
point of view (Makkreel 65-75). Baumgarten’s postulation of the essence 
of human beings not only as res cogitans but also as felix aestheticus also 
offers a new interpretation of humanity from an anthropological point of 
view (Gross 404). Furthermore, aisthetics has identified Baumgarten as a 
key philosopher who provides a possible methodology to develop 
aesthetics beyond mere philosophy of arts or beauty (Kaiser) and explore 
the potential to liberate the idea of sensibility as a passive faculty of a 
spectator (Gross 413). Philological research has questioned the traditional 
view that Baumgarten saw beauty as an objective property and thus he  
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fell into intellectualism (Tsugami 30-59).2 Recent commentary has thus 
discussed the potential of Baumgarten’s aesthetics widely and intensively. 
As part of the renewed interest in Baumgarten’s aesthetics, this essay 
attempts to elucidate the genealogical and metaphysical grounds for 
Baumgarten’s positive re-evaluation of the sensory. Initially the origin of 
his re-evaluation is clarified through a genealogical examination of the 
concept of “confusion” in Descartes’ and Leibniz’ epistemology. 
Secondly, the metaphysical grounds are examined through an analysis of 
the metaphysical basis used by Baumgarten to justify the value of 
“confused” perception. Ultimately, this essay aims to illuminate the 
cognitive and the ethical scope of “confusion” in Baumgarten’s 
aesthetics. 
2. The genealogical grounds 
The first question is the genealogical grounds on which Baumgarten 
attempted to reconcile the sensory and the intellectual. When he defined 
aesthetics as a science of sensory cognition, it was to establish an 
independent philosophical discipline of “clear” but “confused” cognition 
(M §520, A §15).3 Gross has given an historical explanation of 
Baumgarten’s re-evaluation of the sensory, attributing it to the tension 
existing at that time between German Pietism and Enlightenment 
rationalism; having grown up in the Pietist orphanage and learning 
Wolffian rationalism which was secretly taught in the school, 
Baumgarten was searching for a third way that could reconcile the two 
while recognising the limitations of each (405-408). In addition to Gross’ 
insight, Baumgarten stated that sensory perception can be cognitive and 
therefore the method to attain truth by means of “clear-confused 
perception” has to be an object of philosophy (A §6). He also suggested 
that enhancement of sensory perception can be advantageous for the act 
of rational perception (A §9). These two beliefs motivated Baumgarten to 
attempt to reconcile rationalism and sensationalism by working on the 
science of sensory perception.  
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With regard to the philosophical ground which this essay explores, it 
is possible to state that rationalists themselves had a tension within their 
doctrine. On one hand, rationalism developed a system of logical 
reasoning, whose results were demonstrable and indubitable. On the other 
hand, rationalism struggled with practical philosophy and psychology. In 
particular, when rationalists attempted to relate the concept of morality 
and experience of art to the principle of certitude, they were unsuccessful. 
Descartes is crucial to a consideration of this dilemma as his discussion 
of emotion led him to move away from his complete devaluation of 
sensory experience. Therefore, the genealogical examination necessitates 
a reconsideration of Descartes’ epistemology.  
Descartes’ distinction between “distinctness” and “clarity” in his 
Principles of Philosophy (hereafter abbreviated as Principles) determined 
the rationalistic predilection for “clear and distinct perception” and its 
dismissal of “clear but indistinct perception” having epistemic values (AT 
VIII 21-22).4 “Clarity” of a perception consists of an ability to distinguish 
between one perception and another. A similar definition is also found in 
Baumgarten’s Metaphysics:  
The perception whose notes are only sufficient for distinguishing it 
with the greatest difficulty from the one most different thing is 
minimally clear… The representation whose notes are merely 
insufficient for distinguishing it most easily from one maximally 
similar thing is minimally obscure. (§528)  
At this point, both philosophers shared the idea of positing an experiential 
distinguishability to be the criterion of the concept of “clarity”. However, 
Descartes considered that “clarity” is necessary but insufficient for 
perception of truth; truth also needs “distinctness” which requires not 
only an experiential conviction but also difference and precision which is 
free from any pre-judgment of memory or imagination (Principles AT 
VIII 32-33). A perception is “clear and distinct” when it is articulable by 
means of intellectual reasoning in which each constituent of reasoning 
and the logical connection between them is independently “clear”. The 
“clear” but “indistinct” notion is characterised as “confused” or “obscure” 
and excluded from the method to obtain truth. 
The meaning of “distinctness” in the Cartesian sense is further 
elucidated by Gaukroger, who contrasts Descartes’ deductive reasoning 
with the logical reasoning of earlier philosophers, especially, the 
categorical syllogism. In the categorical syllogism, one example can be 
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more informative than another even if both syllogisms are concluded in 
the Barbara mode. This is possible because the difference in conclusion 
is drawn not from the logical connection of premises itself but from the 
personal views which accept the validity of premises (Gaukroger 17). 
Gaukroger’s analysis follows that Descartes’ deductive reasoning suffices 
for the discovery of truths because it completely eliminates personal 
views and depends on the purely logical connection between what is 
perceived. His insight is vital to characterise the criterion of Descartes’ 
concept of “distinctness”. That is to say, Descartes separates logical 
persuasion from logical demonstration. Going back to Descartes’ own 
remarks, syllogism is useful to develop the skill of disputation but 
unsuitable for the discovery of truth because syllogism leads to a mere 
probability (Rules AT X 362-366). Reliance on “things perceived 
distinctly” only enables us to discover the self-evident logical connection. 
He stated that “…all things are so interconnected that it is much easier to 
learn them all together than to study each in isolation” (Rules AT X 361). 
What is to be noted here is the “interconnection” between “things” (res), 
not between persons. Descartes considered that only in the virtue of the 
abandonment of personal arbitrariness does logic acquire demonstrability. 
The criterion of the concept of “distinctness” lies in “interconnection” in 
this precise sense. Accordingly, “confusion” is eliminated from the 
cognitive realm.  
However, Descartes’ exploration into passions took a different view. 
If his criterion of “distinctness” is strictly sustained, any passion cannot 
possess an epistemic value because emotional perception is only 
experientially articulable and thus “confused”. Indeed, Descartes 
conceded that “emotions or passions of the soul” are “confused thoughts” 
because “the mind does not derive from itself alone but experiences as a 
result of something happening to the body with which it is closely 
conjoined” (Principles AT VIIIA 317). Passions lack an indubitable 
interrelationship between “things perceived”, namely, “distinctness”. 
Hence, no matter how strongly they are manifested, passions cannot be 
conceived as “clear-distinct perception”. Nonetheless he deviated from 
this principle when he introduced the concept of “internal emotions” 
(émotions intérieures) which was thought to be incorporeal (The Passions 
of the Soul [hereafter Passions], AT XI 440-441). This exception appears 
when he referred to the feeling of joy which is evoked by experience of 
liberal arts and goodness. For example, he differentiated “intellectual joy” 
(gaudium intellectuale) from “animal joy” (laetitia animalis), so that he 
can claim the existence of human emotion which correlates with 
judgment of goodness (Principles ATVIIIA 317). The correlation 
between incorporeal emotion and morality is also alluded to in his 
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discussion of love; “[The sensual love] is nothing but a confused thought, 
aroused in the soul by some motion of the nerves, which makes it 
disposed to have the other, clearer thought which constitutes rational 
love” (“Descartes to Chanut, 1 February 1647” AT IV 602-603). Love is 
also divided here into the sensual and the rational in parallel with the 
contrast between “confused” and “clearer”. This view is compatible with 
his claim that human beings have “distinct” thoughts of what is to be 
loved or valued (Principles ATVIIIA 317). The certitude of moral 
judgment is thus raised up to the “distinct” level.  
The concept of incorporeal emotion reappears in his discussion of 
the experience of arts:  
(…) when we read of strange adventures in a book, or see them acted 
out on the stage, this sometimes arouses sadness in us, sometimes joy, 
or love, or hatred, and generally any of the passions, depending on the 
diversity of the objects which are presented to our imagination. But 
we also have pleasure in feeling them aroused in us, and this pleasure 
is an intellectual joy which may as readily originate in sadness as in 
any of the other passions. (Passions AT XI 441) 
“Clear-confused perception” is again shown to acquire incorporeality in 
this remark. In addition to the pleasure evoked by goodness, the feeling 
of joy from an experience of arts has an independent value in contrast to 
other kinds of passions. The concept of incorporeal emotion helps to 
sustain the trilogy of “intellectuality”, “distinctness” and “true 
knowledge”. “Distinctness” in this context, however, is different from the 
“distinctness” which was developed in his epistemology elsewhere. As he 
admits himself that moral certainty is insufficient to be called absolute 
certainty (Principles AT VIIIA 328), it is still within the domain of 
probability, and in this sense it is still what is perceived “clearly” but 
“confusedly”.  
Consequently, there is a tension in the Descartes’ argument about 
“clear-confused perception” when the issue of moral judgment and 
emotion in relation to works of art are brought to the fore of his 
philosophy. Elimination of probable perception and reliance on “clear-
distinct perception” was a key of his epistemology, but his exploration of 
intellectual emotion is inclined towards the development of an 
independent epistemological domain in which the system operates with 
probability but still possesses high certitude. To give privilege to pleasure 
through liberal arts and goodness ran parallel to his separation of 
intellectual and animal joy. This suggests that both were thought to 
reflect the essence of humanity. In his consideration of human beings as 
rational animals, leaving aside intellect, a capacity of feeling pleasure 
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from goodness and arts was also regarded as the endowments given to 
human beings exclusively. Then, he prospected that there must exist a 
faculty of judgment which enables human joy. Here, the ethical and 
cognitive scope of human emotion is nascent. However, it is “confused” 
and thus it is incompatible with his strict dismissal of “confused” 
perception from its judgmental ability.  
One of the philosophers who attempted to deal with the validity of 
“confused” perception with regard to morality and works of art was 
Leibniz. It has been pointed out that the essence of Leibniz’ attempt lies 
in taking the concept of “confusion” and seeing it as being fused into 
togetherness (Beiser 39). This was done through the introduction of the 
concept of “marks” (marques): the definitive constituents of a perception. 
Leibniz contended that “distinct” perception requires a distinguishability 
of all “marks” (Discourse on Metaphysics [hereafter Metaphysics] G IV 
449).5 If knowledge lacks an ability to be differentiated by “marks”, such 
knowledge was called “confused”.6 “Confused” perception is “clear”, as 
far as it is possible to distinguish one perception from another through 
sensory experience as a whole. This classification stimulated Baumgarten 
to explore the concept of “confusion” further. Baumgarten divided 
“clarity” into two kinds; “intensive clarity” which is “distinct” and 
“extensive clarity” which is “confused”: 
When in representation A more is represented than in B, C, D, and so 
on, but all are confused, A will be said to be extensively clearer than 
the rest. We have had to add this restriction so that we may distinguish 
these degrees of clarity from those, already sufficiently understood, 
which, through a discrimination of characteristics, plumb the depths of 
cognition and render one representation intensively clearer than 
another. (R §16) 
This passage succinctly shows that “extensive clarity” depends on the 
number of “marks” which constructs a single representation. 
While Baumgarten characterized poetry as extensively clear 
representation, Leibniz also positively re-evaluated the value of 
“confusion” in the famous issue of “I don’t know what” (je ne sais quoi) 
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in the judgment of works of art. He stated that “…we sometimes see 
painters and other artists correctly judge what has been done well or done 
badly; yet they are often unable to give a reason for their judgment but 
tell the inquirer that the work which displeases them lacks ‘something, I 
know not what’” (“Meditations” G IV 423). The ground of the judgment 
of art is never “distinct” because judgment is made only sensorily. 
Nonetheless, he admits that such judgment has epistemic value, as a work 
of art is an example of perfection in the “confused” realm. Although 
“confused” knowledge was separated from “necessary truth”, it was still 
regarded as “contingent truth” (“Necessary and Contingent Truths” LPW 
96-105).  
This positive re-evaluation of “clear-confused perception” derives 
from Leibniz’ theory of ‘the harmony pre-established’ (harmonie 
préétablie): 
The soul follows its own laws, and the body its own likewise, and they 
accord by virtue of the harmony pre-established among all substances, 
since they are all representations of one and the same universe. (The 
Monadology G VI 620) 
The multiplicity of things was explained as different perspectives of a 
single universe and accordingly the reason for “confusion” was attributed 
to the complexity of this “unity in multiplicity”. It follows that not only 
our intellect can discover the order in this universe, any entity, including 
our body, but also embodies the order. He articulated this idea in relation 
to “clear-confused perception” and stated that “…our confused sensations 
result from a really infinite variety of perceptions” (Metaphysics G IV 
459). Furthermore, the unity in multiplicity in the realm of “confused” 
perception is related with the concept of perfection; “Each soul knows the 
infinite, knows everything, but confusedly” (Principles of Nature and of 
Grace, Founded on Reason G VI 604). 
According to Leibniz, the role of a rational mind is to reflect on the 
experience and explicate its reasoning. Due to its inability to self-reflect, 
a faculty that perceives things “clearly” but “confusedly” is called a lower 
cognitive faculty. In this context, he proposed the hierarchy of 
knowledge.7 However, since what is cognized by the lower faculties is 
shared by the higher faculties, there is a legitimate bridge between the 
“clear-confused” realm and the “distinct” realm. In other words, what is 
cognized by “clear-confused perception” can be recognized by the 
“distinct” mind. In this way, although Leibniz did not completely 
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consider the independent value of “confusion”, the devaluation of 
“confused” perception is invalidated. He conceded that even a “confused” 
perception can possess an epistemic value. Here, mere sensory perception 
converts into sensory cognition.  
The reason why Leibniz developed such a teleological principle is 
related to Leibniz’ theology. Descartes considered that human beings and 
God do not share knowledge together; what we know is determined by 
God’s will, but we cannot know what God knows. This follows that there 
remains a possibility of truth which can never be thinkable even ideally. 
What he called “object” (obiectum) is nothing but a human idea of 
object.8 Consequently the substance of an object is an idea of substance 
within the realm of human intellectual thinking. In this way, Descartes 
placed the object itself outside the human understanding and opened a 
possibility of an unseen system of knowledge beyond the intelligible 
“objective reality”. By contrast Leibniz saw God as omniscient, and that 
human knowledge and God’s knowledge are univocal (Metaphysics G IV 
428). If what is known by human beings is equal to God’s knowledge, a 
possibility of another intelligible system of knowledge outside human 
intelligibility disappears.9 Furthermore, if God is defined as being perfect 
and infinite, his knowledge also has to have no possibility of otherness.10 
Consequently Leibniz’s concept of God eliminates what Descartes 
implicitly suggested, that is, a possibility of unintelligible otherness. 
Since all knowledge is within the unity which God ordains, human 
knowledge of truth also must fall within the unity of the system of God’s 
knowledge. This view of human knowledge therefore requires every 
existence to be subordinated to the united order. What is vital is that this 
promoted the re-configuration of the locus of interconnection between 
objects, or ratio.11 For Descartes, rationality of an idea was determined by 
whether human beings perceive the interconnection between 
representations themselves. The interconnection is intellectually discovered 
by human beings, not derived from elsewhere. On the other hand, for 
Leibniz, rationality is not only within the realm of human ideas but also 
within the law which governs the whole universe. Since there is only one 
law which determines everything in this universe, the whole of this 
universe itself is the only possibility. Even if human beings cannot 
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comprehend the law as perfectly as God, the law still exists everywhere 
regardless of human awareness. On this basis, positive re-evaluation of 
the “confused” realm can be understood. Even if a perception turns out to 
be “confused”, rationality should still be there. Although this violates the 
principle of absolute necessity in Descartes’ methodology, it is not 
problematic for Leibniz. This is because everything is pre-determined by 
the universal law regardless of what is to be perceived or how things are 
perceived.  
Seeking the cognitive value in “confused” perception was implicitly 
nascent in Descartes’ discussion of emotion and was explicitly developed 
in Leibniz’ epistemology. Both philosophers, despite their differences, 
saw the necessity of a positive re-evaluation of “confusion” regarding 
moral feeling or experience of art. Behind this motivation, there was a 
consciousness that morality and art are the hallmarks of humanity as 
rational beings and thus have special values in their certainty, even if 
experience of them is not in the realm of “distinctness”. That is to say, 
admitting the certainty of “confusion” accorded with their attempt to 
acquire immutable and infinite value in the cognitive and ethical aspect of 
“confusion”. This genealogical background constituted the bedrock of 
Baumgarten’s aesthetics.  
3. The metaphysical grounds 
The second task of this essay is to explain the metaphysical grounds 
for Baumgarten’s formulation of the cognitive and ethical value in 
“confusion”. This requires a close examination of his concept of 
aesthetics and the way it changed over the course of his writings. 
Baumgarten first postulated the cognitive value of “confusion” in his 
Reflections on Poetry in which the term “aesthetics” was coined. This 
dissertation proposed the conditions for poetry defined by Baumgarten as 
“perfect sensate discourses” (R §7), namely, “aesthetic” discourses. Due 
to the influence of Leibniz, perfection was attributed to the modality of 
“confusion”, that is the harmonized unity of marks. Baumgarten then 
considered that if more marks are gathered together into one perception, 
such perception is “extensively clearer” (extensive clarior) (R §16). 
Perfection of the sensate discourses thus depends on the magnitude of 
“extensive clarity” (R §§17-18). If each word in a poem owns “extensive 
clarity” in itself and the combination of those words also possesses 
“extensive clarity” as a whole, the magnitude of “extensive clarity” 
increases and produces “vividness” as a sensate effect (R §112). Here 
“extensive clarity”, as the modality of “confusion”, with “vividness”, as 
the entailed effect, constitutes the conditions for poetry itself.  
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Poetry does not offer conceptual knowledge precisely because of the 
status of “confusion” but, nonetheless, Baumgarten contended that poetry 
could possess epistemic values. In Reflections of Poetry he did not 
discuss this point in detail, but it is possible to argue that poetic 
knowledge was thought to be both of the knowledge of the particular and 
of “the sign” (signum). His concept of sign may be traced to a definition 
provided in §347 of his Metaphysics, where he defined the sign as “the 
principle of knowing the signified”. In order to clarify this aspect, it is 
useful to look at the examples of poetic representations Baumgarten 
raised in Reflections of Poetry. He stated that a description of a species is 
“extensively clearer” than that of a genus (R §20). Accordingly, a 
description of an individual is “extensively clearest” because it is 
“determined in every respect” (R §19). His claim is adequate considering 
that a species requires more determiners to define it than a genus, let 
alone an individual (R §18). Taking the condition of “extensive clarity” 
into account, determiners of an individual have to be perceived as unified. 
In other words, an individual has to be perceived as being composed of 
determiners which are not irresolvable because they are “confused”. 
Consequently, aesthetic knowledge, if any, can be the knowledge of the 
particular: borrowing his terms from his Metaphysics, the knowledge of a 
completely determined being, or the “singular”.12 In addition, poetry 
provides the knowledge of “the sign”. Baumgarten succinctly claimed 
that a poem consists of “… (1) sensate representations, (2) their 
interrelationships (2) words as their signs” (R§10). It is crucial to regard 
words as signs not as concepts. The metaphor which he raised as an 
example of poetic representations illustrates this argument. Consider the 
following metaphor: “This person is a lion in battle”. Since “to be a lion” 
is not a quality of “the person” in its literal sense, “to be a lion” is what 
Baumgarten called “non-proper” (improprius) and “more abundant” 
(crebrior) description (R §79, §83). Nonetheless, it is possible to assume 
that there is a similarity between “the person” and “a lion”. The structure 
of similarity is “confused” not “distinct” because there is no 
interconnection between objective realities. It relies on our views to see 
their similarity. In other words, it needs the power to unite two unrelated 
things (R §65).  
Now it is possible to explore the account of the knowledge of the 
particular and “the sign” (R §10) in aesthetics by means of this idea of the 
power of unification. This is related to the interconnection in poetry 
which Baumgarten postulated as the second component of a poem. It is 
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argued that such an aesthetic nexus exists in the particular and the sign, 
and is perceived by the judgment of the senses. Baumgarten noted that 
“…the interconnection [nexus] of poetic representations must contribute 
to sensate cognition. Therefore, it must be poetic. Such is the power of 
order and connection” (R §65). 
As has been discussed above, the interconnection between objective 
realities was regarded as the criterion of intellectual judgment since 
Descartes. The quoted passage also used the same term, but the meanings 
are qualitatively different. The interconnection of a poem signifies the 
inner connection of determiners which an individual or a “sign” holds 
within. The contrast between the logical nexus and the aesthetic nexus is 
further clarified in his discussion of abstraction in Metaphysics. He stated 
“I AM ATTENTIVE to that which I perceive more clearly than other 
things” and then “I ABSTRACT away that which I perceive more 
obscurely than other things” (M §529). That is to say, abstraction is 
distillation of “distinct” perception from thoughts in general in order to 
acquire universal and objective knowledge, although Descartes separated 
objective reality from object itself. In Kant’s commentary on this passage 
from Metaphysics, he also said that the abstraction of that which were 
perceived more “clearly” from those things which were perceived 
“obscurely” distinguishes the objective from the subjective.13 By contrast, 
aesthetic nexus signifies manifold connections in the particular, which 
cannot be abstracted. Such interconnection is not depicted as a reflection 
of static unity, but as an active power of unification. This connection is 
called “nexus” and is peculiar to the locus of “the aesthetic”.  
The judgment of the senses is introduced as a faculty to identify such 
aesthetic nexus, being independent of the judgment of the intellect (R 
§92). Baumgarten claimed: 
The judgment of the ear is either positive or negative, the positive 
judgment produces pleasure, the negative displeasure; since a 
confused representation determines both, it is sensate, and poetic. It is 
poetic to excite either displeasure or pleasure in the ear. (R §93)  
What is vital here is that judgment of the senses “produces” (procreo) 
pleasure. In other words, judgment precedes sensate pleasure. 
Baumgarten not only accepted the involvement of judgment in 
“confused” perception but also posited it to be the source of aesthetic 
truth, preceding self-awareness of it through sensate pleasure. Unlike 
intellectual judgment, aesthetic judgment is pre-conscious. Its existence is 
only suggested by an experience of pleasure, namely a result of an 
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experience of aesthetic representation. It is noteworthy that Baumgarten 
did not state that pleasure determines judgment. Rather, pleasure 
discloses the existence of judgment. Pleasure is based on the cognitive 
judgment of aesthetic truth. Once it finds the nexus, it produces pleasure, 
namely, a feeling of “vividness”. It is noteworthy that the aesthetic is not 
determined by accumulation and generalisation of pleasing objects. 
Pleasure is regarded as the after-effect of the judgment. Later, Kant 
distinguished the judgment of the senses from the judgment of taste; the 
former concerns the agreeableness of the sensation and the latter concerns 
beauty as the effect of the free play of faculties (AK 5: 205-207, 239-
243). Through this separation he distinguished the private judgment of 
the objects, which are pleasurable, from the universal judgment of beauty 
(AK 5:209-213). In the case of Baumgarten, these two judgments are not 
separated. However Baumgarten noted that the judgment of the senses is 
not identical to the judgement of taste inasmuch as the term “taste” may 
imply more than “confused” judgment (R §92). Through his persistence 
in the use of the term “senses”, Baumgarten attempted to validate the 
independence of sensory judgment. Unlike Kant, Baumgarten did not 
pursue the universality of the content of “the aesthetic”. If the particular 
is taken as an individual entity made up of internal determiners as a 
whole but the determiners cannot be completely identified externally,14 
Baumgarten’s interest lay in how each entity can attain the realm of “the 
aesthetic” without an exclusion of any determiner.15  
The cognitive scope of “confusion” in aesthetic perception is further 
elucidated in Baumgarten’s Metaphysics. It was published between 1739 
and 1779, which includes four editions within his lifetime and three 
posthumous editions. Revisions made during the period between 1739 
and 1750 are especially important as it is the time when Baumgarten was 
developing Aesthetics which would be published in 1750/58.  
Throughout all editions Metaphysics locates aesthetics in psychology 
as “the science of the general predicates of the soul”, namely, 
metaphysics of the soul and its experience (M §501). Psychology is 
divided into empirical and rational, and aesthetics belongs to the former. 
To use Baumgarten’s phrase, empirical psychology deals with “my soul” 
(anima mea) whereas rational psychology treats the “human soul” (anima 
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humana) (M §505, §740).16 This contrast reflects the manner in which 
empirical psychology is envisaged as metaphysics of particularity and 
subjectivity in sensory perception, while rational psychology is envisaged 
as metaphysics of universality and objectivity in logical reasoning. Based 
on this framework, aesthetics is defined as “…the science of sensitive 
knowing and presenting (proponendi) with regard to the senses” (M 
§533). This definition of aesthetics is consistently maintained in his 
systematic metaphysics throughout all the editions. 
While the definition of aesthetics was constant, its supplementary 
explanation by Baumgarten varied in relation to the emphasis given to its 
constituent elements. In the first edition, aesthetics as a science of sensory 
cognition is discussed in relation to rhetoric and poetics (M §533).17 The 
parallel between poetics and aesthetics reflects the view developed in his 
Reflections on Poetry in which poetics corresponds to the explication of 
conditions for aesthetic representation. In other words, poetics is 
conceived as one of the genres as well as the most prime genre of 
aesthetics (R §40, §115). In this context, theoretical aesthetics is to be 
followed by the practical philosophy of liberal arts which provides a 
priori principles to create or appreciate good works of art. 
In the second edition however, Baumgarten excluded reference to 
rhetoric and poetics. He claimed that aesthetics deals with “the logic of 
the inferior cognitive faculty” (M §533), namely, the faculty of “clear-
-confused perception”. Instead of the parallel between poetics and 
aesthetics, the contrast between “clear-confused perception” and “clear-
-distinct perception” became more conspicuous. Since this change was 
maintained in future editions, it was not a trivial change. Therefore the 
following question arises: what does this change imply? 
Considering that this revision was done in the transitional period 
from Metaphysics to Aesthetics, the exclusion of the reference to poetry 
would be influenced by his expansion of the conception of “art” (ars). In 
his Reflections on Poetry, only poetry and pictures were referred to as 
genres of art. However in Aesthetics Baumgarten used engravings and 
music as well as poetry and pictures as examples of art, expanding the 
object of aesthetics from poetry to liberal arts in general. A more critical 
point is that he added the art of thinking itself as the object of aesthetics. 
The word “art” has a double meaning: arts as fine arts or liberal arts and 
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 “The soul” is understood by Baumgarten as the source of “thought” (cogitatio). 
“Thought” designates consciousness itself, which occurs in the mind prior to being 
differentiated into sensory feeling or intellectual thinking. “Representation” is 
some manifestation of its existence, which supraliminal consciousness entails.  
17
 Also see the note 24, ibid., p. 433. 
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art as technique or practice. His additional comment shows that he 
included art as technique in his definition of aesthetics. At this point, 
aesthetics was stretched from philosophy of works of art to philosophy of 
living in general. The fourth and posthumous editions include a German 
supplement by Meier. In the supplement, aesthetics is explained as die 
Wissenshaft des Schönen (M §533). This understanding of aesthetics was 
criticised by later philosophers who claimed that there are neither a priori 
principles of beauty nor objective rules of beauty. The concept of 
“beauty” (pulcritudo) was first discussed in Metaphysics (M §662) and 
finally brought to the fore in Aesthetics. In this sense, the supplement is 
adequate but it is also noted that in the original and Baumgarten’s 
revisions of Metaphysics and in his Aesthetics, this definition did not 
appear. In fact, the definition of beauty in Baumgarten’s aesthetics 
requires a close examination of his Aesthetics. 
Beauty was defined as perfection of sensory cognition in §14 of 
Aesthetics; “Aesthetices finis est perfectio cognitionis sensitiuae, qua 
talis, §.1. Haec autem est pulcritudo…” The choice of the term “sensory 
cognition” rather than poetry or other genres of works of art is crucial. As 
the revised definition of aesthetics in the second edition of Metaphysics 
suggests, Baumgarten’s primary interest lay in the art of thinking which 
can produce aesthetic cognition, namely, beauty. The role of aesthetics is 
not to determine a priori principles of “beauty” as an abstract concept. 
Rather, beauty as the object of aesthetics is sought as a result of the 
completion of the enhancement of human sensibility.  
This expansion of the scope of aesthetics accorded with his partial 
re-configuration of the Leibnizian principle of “unity in multiplicity” and 
with his growing interest in the similarity between human sensibility and 
human rationality. In terms of the re-configuration of the concept of 
“unity in multiplicity”, it is useful to pay attention to Baumgarten’s 
concept of “representation” (repraesentatio). Although his use of the 
term “perception” (perceptio) and that of “representation” is generally 
interchangeable, the term “representation” was preferred throughout the 
development of his aesthetics. Aesthetic representation is defined as the 
“thought” (cogitatio) produced by the power of “my soul” (M §§506-
507). “My soul” is differentiated by Baumgarten from the “human soul”, 
which he envisaged as the source of rationality – the universal order 
which all human beings share (M §740). Representation concerning “my 
mind” is considered to be a manifestation of the individually subjective 
power. Taking “representation” as such, “sense representations” involve 
immediate and mutable perception via individual subjectivity. To put it 
the other way around, it promises neither sequential nor stable 
recognition. Rather it signifies not only contingent but also non-universal 
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cognition. The view that aesthetic representation is not a property of an 
object is related to his interpretation of beauty. He argued that beauty 
pertains to “phenomena” (phaenomena), which are defined as 
“confusedly” observable cognition, and emphasised that aesthetic 
phenomena should not be understood as an object or material but should 
be understood as “things” (res) which are represented in a mind.18 
Aesthetic representation does not equate to the characteristics of an 
object. Emergence of aesthetic perception is inevitably involved with a 
subject as the creator of representation. The quality Baumgarten 
emphasised was neither objective nor subjective, but relational, what he 
called “representational truth” (veritas repraesentationis) (A §427).  
Consequently he accepted the subjectivity as the essential source of 
aesthetic cognition. Aesthetic truth is not defined by authority or 
tradition, it is determined by how things are perceived. In other words, 
the mode of perception itself determines aesthetic truth. To accept an 
individual capacity to judge truth is an inheritance from Cartesian 
egalitarian revolution: truth is determined depending on how things are 
perceived by subjects and thus every human being who is able to perceive 
can legitimately discover truth. However in addition to the Cartesian 
concept of the substance of human beings, namely, incorporeal “res 
cogitans”, Baumgarten regarded sensibility as the other part of the 
essence of humanity. Gross has argued that one element of the 
importance of Baumgarten’s philosophy lies in his attention to human 
beings as “felix aestheticus”, which comprises “felix” (happy, lucky) and 
“aestheticus” (aesthetic practitioner); “…felix aestheticus can be 
interpreted as the sensible creator and developer of his own world, that is, 
human culture” (405-406) . Baumgarten considered that to be human, in 
contrast to the rest of the animals, is to be both res cogitans and felix 
aestheticus. The former is indispensable for acquisition of logical truth, 
while the latter is necessary for the acquisition of aesthetic truth.  
Furthermore Baumgarten developed his focus on the similarity 
between human rationality and human sensibility rather than the 
disjunction between them. In fact, in Aesthetics, aesthetics was posited as 
“the sister of logic” (A §13). This does not mean that Baumgarten 
ultimately fell into Leibnizian intellectualism. Through a re-configuration 
of the Leibnizian doctrine of “unity in multiplicity” and acceptance of 
subjective involvement in aesthetic judgment, the aesthetic realm was 
detached from the intellectual realm. Nonetheless, not only did 
Baumgarten pay attention to the difference between logical reasoning and 
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 M §425: “we call OBSERVABLE (phenomena) that which are able to know 
(confusedly) through the senses.” Also see A §§18-20.  
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aesthetic appreciation but he also emphasised the analogy between the 
two. This explicitly results in the introduction of the concept of 
“analogous reason” in the definition of aesthetics at the outset of his book 
Aesthetics: “Aesthetics (the theory of the liberal arts, the lower study of 
perception, the art of thinking in the fine style, the art of analogical 
reasoning) is the science of perception that is acquired by means of the 
senses” (A §1).19 That is to say, the key to reading the riddle of 
rationalism, that is, how the cognitive and ethical value of “confusion” 
can be vindicated, was sought by Baumgarten by means of the analogy 
between reason and aesthetic sensibility.  
Although there is no detailed explication of the analogue of reason, 
its definition in Metaphysics is as follows: “All of these [inferior 
cognitive faculties], insofar as they are similar to reason in representing 
the nexus of things, constitute the analogue of reason…” It is also 
referred to as “…the collection of the soul’s faculties for representing a 
nexus confusedly” (M §640). As was argued previously, aesthetic nexus 
is the inner connection of the particular and the sign derived from the 
relationship between the sensory power and the object. That is to say, 
there is a similarity between the intellectual and the sensory inasmuch as 
both represent nexuses; the former represents them “distinctly” and the 
latter represents them “confusedly”. In Aesthetics, the aesthetic nexus 
based on the analogy between aesthetic judgment and logical judgment is 
further explained as “aesthetico-logica” (A §427). “Aesthetico-logica” 
means the order which permeates the realm of aesthetic representation 
exclusively; it is neither objective nor subjective, but relational. He 
conceived that the nexus in the intellectual realm and the nexus in the 
sensory realm are incompatible; one reveals the necessity of the order in 
the universe and the other is subservient to contingency in the universe. 
“Intuition” (intuitio) of the nexus in the latter realm is the form of 
aesthetic cognition.20 
Regarding the character of aesthetic cognition, from the second 
edition of Metaphysics onward, Baumgarten added the following 
explanation: “Consciousness of truth is certitude (subjectivity 
considered). Sense certitude is persuasion, whereas intellectual certitude 
is conviction” (M §531).21 This is where the ethical scope emerges in 
Baumgarten’s aesthetics. Logical conviction is necessarily determinable. 
By contrast, aesthetic persuasiveness lacks such necessity. Due to this 
absence of necessity, aesthetic perception is conditioned by freedom. 
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 This English translation is cited from Art in Theory 1648-1815. 
20
 With regard to the relationship between intuition and beauty, see A §37.  
21
 See also A §§847-885, §§900-904. 
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Then, in the second edition, he added another comment saying that 
freedom is “moral”.22 This observation reflects a point of view that 
morality appears to us intuitively rather than demonstratively. If we call 
the most fundamental axiom from which ethical judgements are deduced 
“the ethical principle”, the principle is not demonstrable but simply and 
intuitively felt to be correct. This point was admitted even by Descartes 
who stated that moral certainty is insufficient to be called absolute 
certainty; it is still within the domain of probability, and in this sense it is 
still what is perceived “clearly” but “confusedly”. Therefore, in order to 
vindicate moral certainty, Descartes had to explain the intellectuality of 
joy via perception of goodness. Leibniz proposed a different solution by 
identifying the dominance of the single law governing the sensory and the 
intellectual. However since Baumgarten accepted the pluralities of 
determiners in forming aesthetic judgment, he was required to propose 
another explanation in support of the concept of moral certainty.  
Therefore Baumgarten observed that human beings can never 
achieve pure freedom in this phenomenal world. Pure freedom is 
conceivable but not representable because, as far as the realm of human 
experience is concerned, its experience depends on bodily existence. 
Consequently, any experience of freedom may be involved with sensory 
choice. This acceptance of bodily existence limits a capability of will but 
on the other hand proves its relationship to the universe, or the whole of 
the world of objective matter. He said: “…both sensitive and free choice 
are actualized through the power of the soul for representing the universe 
according to the position of my body in it” (M §719). Persuasiveness of 
aesthetic reaction connects to freedom, not purely but sensorily. In this 
way, morality is connected to both freedom and the universal law in 
which freedom is limited because of our corporeality. Furthermore, he 
rephrased the sensate effect of aesthetic judgement, namely, “vividness” 
as “liveliness” and attributed the persuasiveness of this liveliness to the 
criteria of aesthetic knowledge (M §531). The aesthetic realm is thus 
overlaid with the ethical realm as well as the epistemological realm. In 
§433 of his Aesthetics, Baumgarten contended that aesthetic truth 
requires moral possibility, which is the result of the act of the analogous 
reason.23 Reason determines the necessary law while sensory perception 
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 M §710: “The faculty of willing or refusing according to one’s own preference is 
FREEDOM (free choice), cf. §707, 708, 710 (moral freedom, freedom in the 
unqualified sense).” Also see M §723. 
23
 A §433: “Veritas aesthetica requirit possibilitatem in obiectis suis B.) moralem a) 
latius dictum (...) ut non nisi a libertate derivanda, talia etiam et tanta sint, qualia et 
quanta ex data libertate, data persona et charactere e.g. hominis certi morali fluere 
videantur analogo rationis”. 
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acts analogously with reason (A §74). However not all sensory perception 
is harmonious in this way. Harmony is only actualised when sensory 
perception is perfected. At this point, mere “aisthetic” turns into 
“aesthetic”. In short, beauty is achieved.  
Thus, beauty is a key to the synthesis of the cognitive and the ethical 
in Baumgarten’s aesthetics. He attempted to synthesise truth, morals and 
beauty within the realm of the sensory representation.24 The sensory 
realm casts a light on the “contingent truth” (M §119). In virtue of its 
analogousness, the sensory can act in conformity with the law of reason 
without necessity but with freedom. He stated: “The purpose of aesthetics 
is perfection of sensory cognition as it is. However it is beauty” (A §14). 
Here, “beauty” meant not a description of an object but a description of 
“perfection” (perfectio) of sensory perception. “Perfection” in this case 
did not mean a description of an object either but a signification of 
completion. There was a shift from perception of perfection to perfection 
of perception between Metaphysics and Aesthetics. The bridge between 
the realm of “clear-distinct perception” and “clear-confused perception” 
was destroyed but the process of reason and sensory perception may be 
seen as acting analogously. Beauty was to be pursued rather than 
explained. The purpose of aesthetics lay in proposing the accumulation 
of a priori principles of the form of beautiful cognition and the method to 
obtain it. The technique of such cultivation, namely, a creation of beauty 
through synthesis of the cognitive and the ethical in “confusion” was 
called “art” by Baumgarten.  
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ABSTRACT 
This article explores the genealogical and metaphysical grounds for the 
positive re-evaluation of the concept of “confusion”, which played a vital role in 
Baumgarten’s foundation of aesthetics as scientia cognitionis sensitivae. First, a 
reconsideration of Descartes’ and Leibniz’ conceptualisations of “confusion” 
attempts to identify the place of Baumgarten’s aesthetics within the rationalistic 
dilemma of evaluating moral and art-related thinking. Secondly, the way in 
which Baumgarten attempted to resolve the dilemma is explored by a close 
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examination of his concept of “the aesthetic” and of how the concept changed in 
the course of his writings. The ultimate purpose of this article lies in illuminating 
an aspect of Baumgarten’s aesthetics, that is, an attempt to synthesize the 
cognitive and the ethical by means of a re-configuration of the concept of 
“confusion”.  
Keywords: aesthetics, sensibility, confusion, beauty, cognition 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Diese Schrift erfoscht die genealogische und metaphysische Grundlage für 
die positive Neubewertung des Konzepts der „Verworrenheit”, das eine wichtige 
Rolle in Baumgartens Konstruktion der Ästhetik als scientia cognitionis 
sensitivae spielte. Zuerst erfolgt eine Neuerwägung von Decartes’ und Leibniz’ 
Konzeptualisierung der „Verworrenheit”. Dadurch wird versucht, die Position 
der Ästhetik Baumgartens im rationalistischen Dilemma, das bei der Bewertung 
des mit Moral und Kunst zusammenhängenden Denkens besteht, zu 
identifizieren. Dann wird durch eine detaillierte Überprüfung von Baumgartens 
Begriff des „Ästhetischen” sowie des Wandels dieses Begriffes im Laufe seiner 
weiteren Werke erforscht, wie Baumgarten versucht hat, dieses Dilemma zu 
überwinden. Das eigentliche Ziel dieser Schrift ist es, einen Aspekt von 
Baumgartens Ästhetik zu veranschaulichen, nämlich den Versuch das Kognitive 
und das Ethische durch eine Umstrukturierung des Begriffs der „Verworrenheit” 
zu vereinigen. 
Stichworte: Ästhetik, Sinnlichkeit, Verworrenheit, Schöne, Erkenntnis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
